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THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID 
 
David Williams 
 
Introduction 
 
The provision of aid to developing countries has become an increasingly important 
part of contemporary international relations. The number of aid donors has increased, 
and the total amount of aid given to developing countries has risen significantly, 
especially in the last 10 years or so. For many developing countries, relations with 
development agencies have become a central part of their international affairs, and for 
some of the most aid dependent states, foreign assistance has become central to their 
ability to provide services to their population. For western states, the provision of 
development aid has become an important instrument for achieving international 
objectives including the cultivating of political allies, opening markets, fighting 
terrorism, and constructing regimes of global governance. The provision of foreign 
aid has also been very controversial. There is an important (and very lively!) debate 
about how effective foreign aid has been in stimulating development, and thus about 
whether donor countries ought to be more generous in their aid provision. In addition, 
over the last ten years or so, there has been increasing pressure on western donors to 
provide aid in a more effective, coordinated and transparent manner. For all of these 
reasons, foreign aid is in important site of investigation into changing practices of 
global economic governance. 
 
Given the centrality of foreign aid to contemporary international politics, it is easy to 
forget that as an institutionalized activity it is a relatively recent phenomenon. While 
there are important precedents, the provision of foreign aid results largely from the 
newly dominant position of the United States at the end of World War Two. Aid was 
seen as an important instrument in the foreign relations of the United States in the 
context of its broad ambition to create a relatively open and prosperous international 
economy and in the context of Cold War competition. While the United States 
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remained the largest provider (in absolute terms) of foreign aid for most of the period 
since the War, the provision of development aid was institutionalized more generally 
with the creation of other bilateral and multilateral agencies. During the period after 
World War Two the developmental paradigms that shaped the provision of aid 
changed significantly, as development agencies and academics responded to changing 
political and economic circumstances inside and outside developing countries.  
 
This chapter explores these issues in turn and ends by reflecting on some of the 
challenges facing development agencies. Despite the quite considerable amounts of 
aid provided over the years, there remain important questions about how successful it 
has been in stimulating and sustaining processes of development, especially in the 
world's poorest countries. Second, the proliferation of aid donors has created 
problems of coordination and harmonisation between donors, both within individual 
development countries and at the more general level, and donors have come under 
increasing pressure to provide aid in a more transparent and accountable way.  
 
This chapter focuses mainly on the donors that make up OECD DAC.1  It does not 
look in detail at 'new' aid donors such as China, nor does it consider the role of NGOs 
in development. Both of these important issues are covered in other chapters in this 
volume (?????). The OECD defines Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as 
flows to developing countries and contributions to multilateral agencies, provided by 
governments or government agencies, which have as their main objective the 
‘promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries’, and 
that are ‘concessional in character’. This means that for monies provided to count as 
ODA there has to be something better about the terms than those available through 
commercial lending - this might be lower rates of interest or longer repayment times. 
This definition excludes military assistance, peacekeeping spending and assistance to 
refugees, even though these are important elements of the relationship between 
western states and developing countries. This definition also excludes private 
                                                        
1 There are 24 members of the OECD DAC: all the major western donors plus the EU. 
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financial flows to developing countries, although for many developing countries, 
especially middle-income ones, private financial flows have at times been very 
significant. Finally, aid encompasses more than just money and can include the 
provision of goods, technology and expertise. 
 
The United States and the Origins of International Development Aid 
 
The origins of foreign aid an institutionalized activity lie in the political and economic 
ambitions of the United States at the end of World War Two. Some of the ideas and 
practices that made up this new form of activity go back a lot further of course. The 
idea that social and economic ‘progress’ was not only possible and desirable, but was 
the one of the main objects of government policy, stretches back at least to the 
Enlightenment. The idea that there might be mutual gains from economic 
development, although contested, again goes back to the ideas of the great 
Enlightenment thinker, Adam Smith. The British Colonial Development Act of 1929 
provided for monies to be spent on development projects in British colonies (Little 
and Clifford 1965: 341-2). A more immediate precedent was the ‘good neighbor 
policy’ instituted by President Roosevelt in the late 1930s, during which the United 
States began to provide development loans to Latin American countries through the 
US Export-Import Bank (Helleiner 2006). 
 
It was in the period after the end of World War Two, however, that international 
development aid became a key part of US foreign relations. The United States ended 
the War in a dominant economic and military position, and it used this to construct an 
international order that preserved and enhanced its own economic and security 
interests (Layne 2006: ch. 2). In 1945 President Roosevelt said that ‘there can be no 
middle ground here. We shall have to take responsibility for world collaboration or 
we shall have to take responsibility for another world conflict’ (quoted in Burley 
1993: 130). Within this broad ambition, assisting developing countries through the 
provision of foreign aid had two different although related objectives. 
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The first was to assist in the development of a vibrant post-war international 
economy. One of the key features of the US post-war order was a commitment to 
characteristically liberal views about the mutual benefits that derived from economic 
development and a relatively open and stable international trading regime (Ruggie 
1982). This was evident in Truman’s ‘Four Point’ speech delivered at his inauguration 
in 1949:  
 
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people in the world are 
living in conditions approaching misery ... Their poverty is a handicap and a 
threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. All countries, including our 
own, will greatly benefits from a constructive program for the better use of the 
world’s human and natural resources. 
 
This was also evident in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD, now the World Bank) at the Bretton Woods Conference in 
1944. US planners thought that the provision of development aid through the Bank 
would benefit the US because economic development would provide export markets 
for US products, and because they thought that economic prosperity and stability 
would lead to political stability and hence improved security for the US. But 
developing countries too were supportive of the Bretton Woods Agreement as they 
saw it as providing assistance and support for their own economic development 
(Helleiner 2006). 
 
The provision of foreign aid was also driven by the emergence of Cold War 
competition. This can be seen as early as 1947 when Truman articulated what became 
known as the ‘Truman Doctrine’ in a speech before a joint session of the US Congress 
on March 12 1947. The backdrop to the Truman Doctrine was an economic crisis that 
gripped Europe during the winter of 1946-7. In the context of increasing tension 
between the US and the USSR, American policymakers became concerned that this 
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crisis would present political opportunities to the already strong communist 
movements in many European states. The Truman administration stepped in and 
provided military and economic assistance to both Greece and Turkey, and provided 
extensive economic assistance to other European countries through the Marshall Plan. 
Truman’s 1947 speech can be seen as the clearest articulation that the US would use 
its financial and military assistance in the context of Cold War rivalry: 
 
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the 
creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a 
way of life free from coercion … I believe that our help should be primarily 
through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and 
orderly political processes … If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger 
the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own 
nation. 
 
In other words, foreign aid would be used explicitly in the fight against communism. 
Other countries followed the United States in developing a foreign aid program, but 
there is little doubt that the US was the first state to make the provision of aid a 
regularized part of its foreign relations as an instrument for achieving both its broad 
economic and international goals, and the narrower goal of containing communism. 
 
The development of the US aid program 
 
Both of these kinds of rationales for the provision of foreign aid can be seen in the 
development of the United States aid program through the Cold War. US foreign aid 
to non-European countries really got going with the 1950 Act for International 
Development (McGuire 1962; Amuzegar 1958). The then Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, said that the Act was a ‘security measure’ as the United States’ ‘military and 
economic security is vitally dependent on the economic security of other people’ 
(quoted in McGuire 1952: 343). In 1954, the International Cooperation 
Administration (ICA) was established to administer foreign aid and technical 
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assistance programs. In the same year the Food for Peace program (sometimes called 
the 480 program) was established to channel food aid to developing countries (Frank 
and Baird 1975: 142). In 1957, the Development Loan Fund (DLF) was established to 
provide loans on more concessional terms to the poorest developing countries. By the 
second half of the 1950s the ICA had established field offices in 60 countries and 
employed over 4000 staff (Cleveland 1959: 219-21). The 1961 Foreign Assistance 
Act created a unified agency – USAID – that drew together the ICA, the DLF, and the 
Food for Peace program. The new agency also started to develop new methods for 
distributing its aid. Of particular importance was the country programming process, 
whereby US aid would be conditional on the recipient country having an economic 
development plan. This contrasted with the previous method of ad hoc funding of 
individual projects (Lancaster 2007: 72). The amount of aid given also increased in 
the first half of the 1960s – particularly to Latin America and increasingly to Sub-
Saharan Africa both in absolute terms and as a per centage of GNP. Although the 
containment of communism was an important element of the renewed stress on 
development assistance, it was also clear that the broader objective of economic 
development was being taken more seriously.  
 
US aid began to rise significantly in the later 1970s and continued to rise through the 
first half of the 1980s for reasons that reflected both the political and developmental 
purposes of aid. The attempt by the Ford Administration to encourage a peace 
settlement between Israel and Egypt led to a significant rise in aid to both countries, 
such that they became the two largest single aid recipients by 1976. The US was also 
providing aid to a number of other states for fairly obvious political/Cold War reasons 
(Turkey – key NATO ally, Philippines – US military bases, Nicaragua – to combat 
left-wing insurgency). But the US was also providing aid to a variety of countries, 
particularly in Africa, where there were no especially compelling political interests – 
Mali, Benin, Burkina Faso for example (Lancaster 2007: 79). In addition, as a result of 
famine in Ethiopia and floods in Bangladesh, emergency aid and food aid rose sharply 
(Lancaster 2007: 178). Despite the initial scepticism of the Reagan administration 
towards foreign aid, much the same continued through the 1980s. Aid to Latin 
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America increased for obviously Cold War reasons, but so did aid to Africa. Total US 
aid to Central and South America rose from $280m in 1980 to $1,175m in 1985, while 
aid to Africa rose from $1,507m to $2,860m. By 1989 US bilateral aid was 30 per 
cent higher than it had been in 1980 (Lancaster 2007: 83). President Reagan neatly 
summarized all this in 1985: ‘in helping our allies and friends meet their security, 
development and humanitarian needs, we directly support US interests and objectives. 
Our foreign assistance programs, despite any perceptions to the contrary, are 
manifestly in our own national interest’ (White House 1985).  
 
The period after the end of the Cold War was a turbulent one for US development aid 
in part because of renewed domestic criticism of the US foreign aid program. 
Nonetheless, by the mid-2000s US aid had nearly doubled from its level in 1989. 
Assistance to the states of Central and Eastern Europe (and then the states of the 
former Soviet Union) to aid their political and economic ‘transition’ to liberal 
economic and political systems became an important new component of US aid. Total 
aid to these state rose to over $2,500m in 1994 (Lancaster 2007: 84; Carothers 1999: 
50). Democracy promotion also became a more significant part of the US aid 
program. Total democracy assistance aid rose from $165m in 1991 to $435m in 1995, 
and aid for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa tripled over the same period (Carothers 
1999: 50-52). Another set of concerns for US aid came in the area of civil wars and 
peace building, and the US provided aid to numerous post-conflict states including of 
course in the Balkans, but also Haiti, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Columbia and Angola 
(Lancaster 2007: 85).  
 
 
[GRAPH ONE ABOUT HERE] 
 
The new Bush administration oversaw a really dramatic increase in US aid. Part of 
this is explained by significant amounts of aid given to Afghanistan and Iraq (and 
Pakistan), but there are other factors at work. First, in the aftermath of September 11 
there was a reorientation of US national security strategy towards seeing developing 
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countries as a source of ‘threats’ to the US, and thus a renewed emphasis on aid as a 
mechanism to combat these (White House 2002). Second, there was a renewed stress 
on the developmental aspects of US aid provision, notably through the Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA) announced in March 2001 (Radelet 2003a; 2003b). This 
provided a significant amount of money to a select group of low-income states that 
were ‘ruling justly, investing in their people and establishing economic freedom’ 
(quoted in Radelet 2003b: 171). The MCA involved 16 specific indicators including 
controlling corruption, respect for political rights, primary education spending, 
inflation and trade policy. It is probably the most important innovation in US aid 
provision since the creation of USAID and it is important to note that it is exactly 
developmental in purpose and targeted at poorer states. Finally, there was a marked 
increase in aid specifically directed at HIV/Aids prevention and treatment.  
 
In 2004 USAID produced a policy paper that summarized the objectives of US aid 
policy (USAID 2004). It announced that the goal of US aid was not simply raising 
living standards, but ‘transformational development’: ‘Far-reaching, fundamental 
changes in institutions of governance, human capacity, and economic structure that 
enable a country to sustain further economic and social progress without depending 
on aid’. The paper also identified four specific goals for US aid: strengthening fragile 
states, responding to humanitarian crises, supporting US strategic interests, and 
managing global problems. There is clear continuity here with the place of 
development within the hegemonic ambitions of the US after World War Two, and it 
demonstrates the continued significance of foreign aid for achieving international 
objectives. 
 
The institutionalization of foreign aid 
 
The provision of foreign aid was institutionalized more widely in international politics 
from the 1950s onwards. Many states developed their own bilateral aid programs, 
partly in response to the emergence of US aid, and partly because they too found that 
foreign aid could be a useful instrument for achieving international objectives. In 
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addition, a number of new multilateral agencies were created. 
 
Bilateral aid 
 
The USSR developed its own aid program from the mid-1950s in response to the 
growth of US aid and as part of a desire to assist countries in a transition to socialism 
(Guan-Fu 1983). While there are some parallels between Soviet and US aid (it was 
used by both to cultivate allies), there are also some differences. For one thing it was a 
lot smaller – for most of the period the Soviet aid program was only about one-quarter 
of the size of that of the US. Soviet aid also tended to be much more ad hoc and 
volatile – falling to almost nothing in the early 1960s, for example (Guan-Fu 1983: 
75). Finally, Soviet aid was never really ‘professionalized’ in the way that it was in 
the US. There was no permanent development agency like USAID, rather a number of 
different bureaucratic entities were responsible for foreign aid. China has become a 
very significant provider of aid in recent years, but as early as the 1950s it too had a 
small but significant aid program, animated by a desire to influence newly 
independent states, and as a mechanism for competing with the USSR for influence in 
the developing world (Poole 1966). 
 
In terms of size at least, the bilateral aid programmes of the western donors such as 
Britain, France and Japan were more significant. For Britain and France, large 
portions of their aid went to former colonies. Even by the mid-1980s, 70% of British 
aid went to Commonwealth countries, and nearly 90% of French aid went to its 
former colonies, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Killick 2005: 65; Lancaster 2007: 
147). Despite the aid programmes of Britain and France being in this sense similar, 
they diverged quite significantly from the 1990s onwards. In 1997 the new Labour 
government in Britain created a new ministry – the Department for International 
Development (DfID) – that significantly increased the profile of aid and development 
issues within government, and oversaw a dramatic increase in total aid provision 
(Young 2001). DfID also modernised Britain’s aid policy, by developing a 
professional research capability and publishing influential policy reports (Morrisey 
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2002; see also DfID 1997, 2000). DfID’s increased role was also related to British 
participation in larger international projects such as Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The situation in France was rather different. The 1990s was a period of crisis in 
French aid. This was related precisely to the close relationships France had tried to 
maintain with her colonies. Many of these colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
experiencing sustained economic crisis, and as France was by far the largest aid donor 
to most of them, this increased the pressure on the French aid budget in the context of 
attempts to cut the French government deficit in preparation for European monetary 
union (see Cumming 1995 and Renou 2002). There was also a growing public 
perception inside France that French aid was being used to prop up African dictators, 
and enrich elements of the French political and economic elite – a perception 
heightened by a series of corruption scandals involving French companies in Africa 
(Lancaster 2007: 157).  
 
Japan is probably the most interesting bilateral donor. Its' aid program was initially 
heavily concentrated on states in the region, and driven significantly by commercial 
considerations. Japanese aid went particularly to finance projects in the energy and 
mining sectors as a way for Japan to gain access to resources (Lancaster 2007: 115; 
Yasutomo 1989: 492). A number of factors in the mid-1970s led Japan to reconsider 
the size, scope and practices of its aid program. The Japanese economy had grown 
rapidly and as its exports had grown so there was a less urgent need to use foreign aid 
to expand export markets in the region. The fact that the economy had done so well 
also led the US to pressure Japan to share more of the burden of managing global 
affairs. Finally, there were some sharp criticisms of Japanese aid from both recipient 
countries and from other western donors about the excessively commercial, rather 
than developmental, elements of Japanese aid (Yasutomo 1989: 492-3). In 1977 Japan 
announced its intention to double its bilateral aid provision. To be sure, some of the 
largest recipients of Japanese aid during the first half of the 1980s remained states in 
the region - Indonesia, Thailand and Burma for example - but by the late 1980s Japan 
had also become the single largest aid donor to a number of African states (Lancaster 
2007: 119). All through the 1990s, Japan was the largest aid donor in dollar terms. 
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This position was the result of the reduction in US aid provision and a deliberate 
strategy to become an 'aid superpower’ (Yasutomo 1989; Lancaster 2007: chap 4). Its 
aid budget doubled through the second half of the 1980s and continued to rise rapidly 
through the first half of the 1990s.  In the second half of the 1990s and into the 2000s, 
however, its aid budget declined as a result of on-going financial and economic crisis. 
 
[GRAPH TWO ABOUT HERE] 
 
Many other countries developed bilateral aid programs, such that we can consider the 
provision of development assistance to have become a ‘norm’ in international politics. 
 
[TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
 
Multilateral aid 
 
At the same time as bilateral aid was becoming a regularized part of international 
politics a number of multilateral development agencies were created. In terms of total 
aid provision and influence the most important was the World Bank (IBRD 
originally). The World Bank differed from the emerging bilateral development 
agencies in that it was established as a particular kind of bank. First, it was founded to 
provide loans for discrete development projects, rather than to provide general 
budgetary support to governments (although from the 1970s onwards it did provide 
this kind of support). Second, the World Bank was expected to raise investment 
capital through the sale of its own securities (bonds) in the financial markets, and 
although these were to be guaranteed by the member governments, the Bank was 
nonetheless established as a financial institution with obligations to those who 
purchased its bonds. This limited both the potential number of borrowers and the 
potential number of projects the Bank could finance. Calls for the provision of 
financing to developing countries on more liberal terms started in earnest in the 
1950s, and led to the creation of IDA in 1960 states (Mason and Asher 1972: 385). 
The World Bank also differed from bilateral aid agencies in that it was also founded 
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on the principle that it would be ‘non-political’. Article III5(b) of The World Bank’s 
Articles of Agreement states that loans shall be granted with ‘due attention to 
considerations of economy and efficiency and without regard to political or other non-
economic influences or considerations’. This supposed non-political stance, however, 
was in tension with the formal power member states exercised through the system of 
weighted voting on the Board of Directors. In general the amount of votes a country 
has on the Board is determined by the amount of capital that countries pay into the 
Bank. The Board is charged with the day-to-day running of the Bank and approves all 
loans, policies, and Bank reports, and this gives developed states considerable power. 
There are also more ‘informal’ mechanisms for the US in particular to exercise 
influence (Gwin 1997). More generally, however, most of the time the US does not 
explicitly exercise the power it has over the Bank because it does not have to: the 
Bank promotes the broad goals of US policy simply though its day-to-day operations 
– as it was designed to do. There is no doubt that the World Bank has been by far the 
most influential development agency. Some of this has to do with the amounts of aid 
it distributes, but it also has to do with its research capability, the long-standing 
relationships it has developed with recipient states and close ties with the US 
government.  
 
The Bank has dramatically expanded the scope of its operations. In the years until the 
1970s the bulk of its lending was for infrastructure projects (Mason and Asher 1972). 
Under the Presidency of Robert McNamara, the Bank expanded its aid provision, but 
also began lending in new areas such as agricultural development, health and 
education. The expansion of the Bank's areas of concern continued through the 1980s 
and 1990s, with issues such as good governance, corruption, environmental 
protection, institutional development, and participation. As the official history of the 
World Bank published in 1997 pointed out, the Bank’s problem by the middle of the 
1990s was that its list of policy priorities had been stretched almost beyond 
recognition (Kapur et al 1997). The Bank has also faced extensive criticism from a 
variety of sources for, among other things, its environmental record, its record in 
dealing with persons displaced by projects it has funded, and its lack of accountability 
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(Rich 1994; Nelson 2001, Udall 1997). The Bank has tried to respond to these issues 
up to a point, and while it is still the subject of much criticism, it is probably also the 
most open and self-critical of all development agencies. 
 
The World Bank was the only multilateral development agency until 1959 when the 
first regional development bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was 
founded. This was followed by the establishment of the African Development Bank 
(AfDB) in 1964, and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) in 1966. These are most 
important regional multilateral development agencies, although there are a number of 
others.2 The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) was created alongside the 
Organization of American States (Tussie 1995). Although Latin American states had a 
significant presence at the Bretton Woods conference they felt increasingly neglected 
by the Bank as it turned its attention to newly decolonized states (Krasner 1981: 305; 
Tussie 1995: 18). The IADB enshrined but also limited US power. The IADB was 
overwhelmingly reliant on US capital for its operations, and there was a degree of 
proportionality in voting rights at the IADB (proportional on provision of capital) that 
gave the US over one-third of votes and thus provided it with an effective veto over 
amendments to the Articles of Agreement (Tussie 1995: 18). On the other hand, the 
extent of proportional voting was limited by the stipulation that at least 50 per cent of 
voting rights lay with the borrowing members so that at least in principle the bank 
remained under the control of the Latin American states. 
 
The AfDB was different from other regional development banks in that it was 
originally established without the participation of developing countries (English and 
Mule 1996). This had the fairly obvious implications that it was relatively poorly 
resourced. In the years after its founding the AfBD found it difficult to raise money on 
                                                        
2       These include: the East African Development Bank (1967), the Caribbean Development 
Bank (1970), the Andean Development Corporation (1970), and the Islamic Development 
Bank (1975). In the post Cold War era these are joined by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1991) and the North American Development Bank (1993). 
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the international financial markets and members states did not fulfil their obligations 
to provide money to the organization (it was not until 2003 that the AfDB received an 
AAA rating from bond rating agencies). The financial problems came to head when 
the AfDB wished to create a soft-loan arm. Developed states were invited to 
participate in what became known as the African Development Fund in 1973. The 
structures put in place to govern this entity are in some respects extraordinary as there 
was a tremendous imbalance between financial contributions and voting rights 
(Krasner 1981: 324). Despite providing the overwhelmingly majority of the funds, 
developed states had less that 50 per cent of the voting rights, thus preserving the 
control of African states. In 1982, developed states were allowed to participate in the 
AfDB itself – thus providing a much needed boost to its capital, but again only on the 
proviso that its' African member states retained a majority of voting rights. Thus the 
AfDB had significant autonomy from developed states, and remained a largely 
African Bank with the President and majority of its staff being from the continent. 
 
The Japanese had been pushing for the creation of a regional development 
organization since the early 1960s (Wan 1995: 511). It felt that its own economic and 
political interests in the region were not well-served by the World Bank, and as it was 
emerging from the immediate post-war period it wanted to exert more influence in the 
region (Kappagoda 1995). The United States was keen to establish a regional 
institution to support its increasing involvement in the region (Krasner 1981: 317). As 
a result of this, the AsBD was different from the IADB and the AfDB in that right 
from the beginning it had a strong presence of developing countries – notably Japan 
and the US, but also Australia and New Zealand, and unlike the IADB and AfDB, 
developing country members never had a majority of the voting rights. Japan is the 
most influential state in the AsDB (Wan 1995).  In 1974 a soft loan arm of the Bank 
was established – the Asian Development Fund – to which Japan contributed nearly 
half the capital. By tradition the President of the Bank is Japanese and the Japanese 
government collaborated closely with the Bank. In the early years of the Bank’s 
operations, the bank served Japan’s economic interests well (Krasner 1981: 319; Wan 
1995: 415). By the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, however, the obvious 
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connection between Bank lending and Japanese economic interests started to decline, 
even as its share of financial contributions to the organization rose. More loans went 
to countries where Japan had no significant economic interests (such as Bangladesh 
and Pakistan) and Japan’s share of procurements also fell (Wan 1995: 517-8).  
 
[TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE] 
 
 As we have seen, foreign aid has been given for a complex set of reasons 
(Morgenthau 1962; Lancaster 2007). Some was certainly given for the purposes of 
maintaining political allies, but even here there have been differences between states: 
France and Britain, for example, have been concerned with maintaining relationships 
with for colonies, while the US and Britain have both used aid as an important part of 
larger international projects. Some aid was also given more for commercial reasons, 
especially by France and Japan, for example. For many states, domestic politics has at 
various times been important in determining aid provision (Noel and Therien 1995). It 
is important not to be too cynical about the provision of development aid, however. 
The fact that over time it has continued to rise, and that fact that an increasing amount 
of it has gone to the world’s poorest states, particularly in Africa, suggest that states 
and development agencies have had a genuine commitment to the broader project of 
development, even if that too is understood to be in some broad sense in the interests 
of aid-giving states. 
 
Changing development paradigms 
 
Since the provision of international development was institutionalized in international 
politics, the theories and arguments that shaped the funding of projects and programs 
have changed quite significantly. In the years up to the early 1970s development 
policy was shaped by the development of a specifically ‘development economics’ and 
by ‘modernization theory’ (Williams 2011: chap 2) Modernization theory was 
concerned with political and social ‘modernization’, understood as the 
institutionalization of democratic government and the emergence of ‘modern’ social 
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and cultural attitudes (Almond and Powell 1965; Almond and Verba 1965; Inkles 
1969, 1975). Development economics was concerned with outlining the economic 
policies that would lead to industrialization and sustained economic growth (Lewis 
1954; Hirschman 1958). Both theories thought that ‘development’ involved processes 
of modernization similar to that of the developed west (industrialization, urbanization) 
and both groups thought that foreign aid could assist countries in that process. Finally, 
both theories (for rather different reasons) assumed that the state would play a 
significant role in driving the process of development, usually though active 
intervention in the operation of markets to provide the appropriate conditions for 
domestic development. In terms of development practice the primary outcome of 
these bodies of thought was a significant stress on infrastructure (dams, roads, ports, 
railways, electricity generation project) and industrialization. 
 
During the 1970s a different set of arguments about ‘basic needs’ and ‘redistribution 
with growth’ came to the fore (Streeten 1981; Chenery et al 1974). In 1973, then 
President of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, said that ‘the basic problem of 
poverty and growth in the developing world can be stated very simply. The growth is 
not equitably reaching the poor. And the poor are not significantly contributing to 
growth’ (McNamara 1973). Associated with this was a new concern with improving 
agriculture (the majority of the poor lived in rural areas), health services and 
education and a downplaying of the role of large capital projects as the key 
determinants of development. This way of thinking about development was short-
lived as a series of economic and political crises engulfed many developing countries, 
and as the ‘golden age’ of capitalism came to an end (Glynn et al 1990). In this 
context a new set of ideas came to the fore sometimes captured under the label of the 
‘Washington consensus' (Williamson 1989). In economic terms this meant the 
liberalization of markets, both internally, especially in agriculture, and externally in 
terms of trade and capital flows. As a corollary of this it meant reducing the role of 
the state in the economy (and thereby reducing the possibilities for rent-seeking and 
corruption) (Lal 1983). In terms of development policy the most important and 
controversial product of this was structural adjustment lending. This was the use of 
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conditional lending by the World Bank and IMF to encourage developing countries to 
enact market-friendly reform programs (for a summary and assessment see Mosley et 
al 1991). Structural adjustment lending was in fact not especially successful, either in 
inducing policy reform or stimulating economic development, and through the later 
1980s and into the 1990s, what is sometimes called the ‘post-Washington consensus’ 
emerged, led in large part by the World Bank. This maintained the stress on the 
importance of allowing the market to allocate economic resources (rather than the 
state) but recognized that a vibrant market economy required a series of effective 
institutions to work at all properly and an effective, but not overbearing state, to 
monitor and regulate it (Williams 2008a). This led to an emphasis on such things as 
legal reform, banking regulation, and reducing corruption on the one hand, and good 
governance, decentralization and sometimes democracy promotion on the other.  
 
By the late 1990s and up to the financial crisis of 2007/8 these arguments gained 
added significance in two ways. First, governance reforms and economic 
liberalization were seen as the key route for developing countries to tap into 
increasingly globalized patterns of trade and finance (DfID 2000; for an assessment 
see Rodrik 2001). Second, governance reforms in developing countries were seen as 
an important part of the construction and expansion of regimes of global governance. 
In the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis and September 11, for example, 
development agencies have taken a leading role in reforming banking and financial 
regulation in developing countries in order to prevent poor regulated financial systems 
from posing a more general threat to western interests (Williams 2008b) 
 
Alongside this, two other new policy concerns should be mentioned. First, a new 
language of ‘participation’, ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’ emerged. At the country 
level this new concern manifested itself most significantly in the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) process initiated by the World Bank and the IMF in 1999 
(Craig and Porter 2003).  The idea behind this was that governments would develop a 
poverty reduction strategy in consultation with civil society groups. Second, a more 
explicit concern with poverty alleviation found expression in the United Nations 
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These were a series of development targets 
established in 2000 and included such things as: halving the proportion of people 
living in absolute poverty (defined as less than one dollar a day); ensuring universal 
primary education; reducing by two-thirds child mortality rates; reducing maternal 
mortality by three-quarters; and halving the proportion of people without access to 
clear drinking water. What makes the MDGs remarkable is not so much their content 
as the fact there was an immediate political consensus among almost all states and 
development agencies as to the desirability of these goals (Fukado-Parr 2004).  
 
The contemporary situation is a complex one. The recent financial and economic 
crisis has undermined the legitimacy of the stress on liberalization and integration into 
the global economy in the eyes of many developing countries. In addition, the 
experience of China has led to a renewed stress on infrastructure and industrial 
development as the keys to development success. On the other hand the achievement 
of the MDGs remains at least officially a guiding principle of all western aid donors 
and good governance and democracy remain key aims of western aid provision.  
 
Challenges 
 
One of the great questions surrounding the provision of development aid is whether 
it ‘works’ to promote economic development, and the answer has very important 
implications for contemporary arguments about whether developing countries need 
more foreign aid. Jeffrey Sachs, for example, has called for a large increase in aid to 
as a way to overcome the ‘poverty trap’ that characterises the world’s poorest states. 
In this view foreign aid can play an important role in stimulating economic 
development (Sachs 2005). Other have been much more sceptical. William Easterly, 
for example, has made some very pointed criticisms of western aid and has argued 
that there is little evidence a substantial increase in foreign aid would make much 
difference to the development of the poorest states (Easterly 2005; 2006). Dambisa 
Moyo has gone even further and argued that foreign aid to Africa has often done 
more harm than good, and she argues that African states need to find a way to wean 
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themselves off aid if that are to be successful (Moyo 2009).  
 
One of the difficulties of coming to any conclusion about this is that assessing the 
impact of aid is difficult. One problem is that ‘works’ might mean different things: 
it could mean that a particular project or programme achieved its stated objectives, 
or it could be understood in terms of impact on broader developmental or 
macroeconomic objectives, such as economic growth or poverty reduction. In terms 
of individual projects and programmes, Roger Riddell has concluded that for most 
donors, project success rates range from 70-85 per cent and that on balance success 
rates have improved compared to 1965-1985 (Riddell 2007: 180). These aggregate 
figures mask significant variations in success rates between countries and across 
sectors. The World Bank had most success in East Asia and the Pacific (nearly 90 
per cent of project judged as successful) and the least in Sub-Saharan Africa (70 per 
cent). In terms of sectors, the World Bank rated its projects in transport, rural 
development and finance at 85 per cent and the environment at less than 70 per cent 
(World Bank 2005). The Asian Development Bank rated transport and energy as its 
best performing sectors (85 per cent), but financial and agricultural sector as its 
worst performing (50 per cent). The African Development Bank rated 75 per cent of 
its agricultural development projects as successful, but only 46 per cent of its 
financial sector projects (Riddell 2007: 182-3). In 1995 the World Bank produced a 
major evaluation of its structural adjustment lending. It reviewed the experiences 
and outcomes of 99 adjustment programs in 42 countries mostly from the mid-1980s 
onwards. Of the 88 operations given a rating, 32 were rated as ‘unsatisfactory’ 
(Jayarajah and Branson 1995: 276-79).  
 
Even if individual projects and programs are more successful than not, this may 
have rather little impact on broader macro-economic or developmental variables, 
which tend to be determined by a complex set of factors and relationships, both 
internal and external (Kenny and Williams 2001). Developmental outcomes are 
shaped by a host of factors (changing terms of trade, oil price rises, fiscal crises, 
political instability), and can improve even with a host of ‘bad’ projects and 
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programmes. Teasing out the impact of aid is then very tricky and is compounded 
by questions about the quality of the macroeconomic and socio-economic data 
available in many developing countries, especially the world’s poorest (Riddell 
2007: 166-7). What evidence there is suggests that inflows of foreign aid may not 
have much positive impact on broad development indicators (Easterly 2005). 
Lancaster has concluded that  ‘most of the econometric studies of the relationship of 
aid to growth have found that aid has no significant impact, either positive or 
negative on economic performance’ (Lancaster 1999: 44). This is not to say that aid 
does not do important and valuable things; but it does suggest that the contribution 
of aid to broad developmental variables might be relatively slight. 
 
Even more unsettling for advocates of foreign aid are those arguments that suggest 
it may have a negative effect on developing countries. Moyo argues that it promotes 
corruption and dependency with significant consequences for development and 
democracy (Moyo 2009: 49). More specifically, it has long been argued that the 
lack of coordination between development agencies creates many problems for aid 
recipients (Cassen 1986: chap 7). Especially in the world’s poorest states there may 
be as many as 30 official aid agencies operating and possibly hundreds of 
development NGOs. In these circumstances, and especially given the relatively 
weak capacity of recipient governments (and a desire on the part of some donors to 
bypass the government) serious problems of coordination have arisen. Often little 
thought was given to how individual projects fitted into an overall development 
strategy or to how recurrent costs would be financed, and donors often funded 
similar projects leading to overlap and redundancy. In addition, different donors 
placed different demands on recipient governments in terms of accounting, auditing 
and procurement.  
 
In recent years there has at least been some recognition of the need to deal with 
these problems. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was an 
international agreement on the part of western donors and developing country 
governments to develop country ‘ownership’ of development strategies, to 
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harmonize donor’s policies, and encourage mutual accountability (OECD 2005). 
Subsequently meetings have been held in Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011 to assess 
progress towards these goals. While the commitment to making foreign aid 
provision more effectives is laudable, progress to date on actually implementing 
new practices has been slow. A 2011 OECD report on the implementation of the 
Paris Declaration suggests that only one of the 13 targets set has been achieved 
(OECD 2011).  
 
Western donors have been criticized for other failings too (Birdsall 2005). It has often 
been argued that they have not paid enough attention to building indigenous 
institutional capacity, and thus not really laid the foundation for sustainable 
development. In many cases donors have simply by-passed existing government 
departments in order to implement their projects quickly. It has also been argued that 
they are often not thorough enough in evaluations of their own projects and programs, 
that they do not withdraw from failing projects and that the assistance they do provide 
is often volatile and unpredictable. Donors are also coming under much more pressure 
from the growing aid transparency movement.3 For example, the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative argues that donors should disclose regular, detailed and timely 
information on volume, allocation and results of development expenditure (when 
available); that they should make public all conditions linked to disbursements; should 
provide full and timely information on annual commitments and actual disbursements; 
and provide developing countries with regular and timely information on their rolling 
three to five year forward expenditure and/or implementation plans (IATI 2012). The 
fact that many donors do not currently do this suggests that quite serious problems 
remain with the relationships they have with many developing countries.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The provision of foreign aid has expanded and changed considerably. It originated as 
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a result of the very powerful position of the United States at the end of World War 
Two. Subsequently many other countries adopted the practice of aid giving, 
multilateral development agencies were created, and the amount of aid provided to 
developing countries has increased substantially. Foreign aid has been provided for a 
number of different reasons. While it would be wrong to deny the genuinely 
developmental purpose of some aid, much of it has also been used for political and 
security purposes, and in more recent times as a mechanism for creating regimes of 
global governance and combating terrorism. The developmental rationale for foreign 
aid has also changed, from a stress on infrastructure, to poverty alleviation, to 
economic liberalisation, to good governance and democracy and now participation 
and poverty reduction (again!). It will almost certainly change again. 
 
While the developmental record of foreign aid has always been questionable it is 
certainly the case that in recent years it has come under a great deal more scrutiny. 
Serious questions have been asked about its effectiveness and about the way in which 
donor practices create a host of problems for recipient countries. Coming to any final 
conclusion about the impact (positive and negative) of foreign aid is hard, in part 
because it is quite hard to measure. It does seem safe say, however, that it has been 
decidedly mixed. Despite all the criticisms of foreign aid, however, there is no reason 
to think that it will disappear any time soon. Western states see it is as an important 
instrument for the achievement of varied international objectives, including 
‘development’ and many developing countries, for good or ill, have become reliant on 
it. It is likely then to remain a central part of international politics and international 
economic governance, warts and all, for many years to come. 
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